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BOUMEDIENE’S QUIET THEORY: ACCESS TO
COURTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Stephen I. Vladeck*
Ronald Dworkin may not have been exaggerating when he
referred to the Supreme Court’s June 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush1 as “one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in
recent years.”2 The Court there held that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause3 “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay,”4 and that the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 20065—which precludes federal
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions brought by noncitizens
 2009 Stephen I. Vladeck. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks
to Michael Froomkin, Amanda Frost, Patrick Gudridge, Judith Resnik, David Vladeck,
and David Zaring for their comments. This article has benefitted substantially from
faculty workshops at Cornell Law School, the University of Nebraska School of Law,
and the University of North Carolina School of Law; from the research assistance of
Emily Pasternak and Usha Neelakantan; and from the insights of Michael Cahill,
Adam Kolber, Katy Kuh, Ethan Leib, Michael O’Hear, Verity Winship, and especially
Dan Markel, at the “PrawfsFest” junior faculty workshop hosted by Hofstra Law School
in July 2008.
In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I have played a role in
various of the contemporary cases discussed herein, including as co-counsel in
Hamdan, and as co-author of an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in
Boumediene. Needless to say, the views expressed herein are mine alone.
1 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2 Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at
18, 18.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”).
4 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. The D.C. Circuit had concluded that the
Suspension Clause did not “apply” to Guantanamo. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d
981, 990–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
5 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28,
42 U.S.C.).
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detained as “enemy combatants”6—fails to provide an adequate alternative to the writ of habeas corpus.7 As such, the Boumediene majority
struck down section 7 of the MCA,8 only the second instance in which
the Supreme Court has invalidated a statute because it unconstitutionally removes federal jurisdiction,9 and the first time it has ever concluded that an act of Congress violates the Suspension Clause.10
Courts and commentators alike have already felled many forests
grappling with the hard questions Boumediene leaves in its wake. Just
for starters, do other constitutional provisions “ha[ve] full effect” at
Guantanamo?11 Does the Court’s analysis of the availability of habeas
corpus to noncitizens at Guantanamo open the door—and the potential floodgates—to habeas petitions from noncitizens held elsewhere
overseas, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq?12 Does the right articulated by the Boumediene majority protect a remedy for claims other than
“core” challenges to executive detention?13 Does it even include a
6 Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)).
On why a statute that only divests the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
could nevertheless violate the Suspension Clause, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Riddle of
the One-Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District of Columbia, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 71
(2008).
7 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
8 Id. at 2275.
9 The only prior example is the Court’s rather obtuse decision in United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–48 (1872), although the precise basis for the
Court’s reasoning in Klein remains open to debate. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Schiavo
and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 537–43 (2005) (discussing two competing views
of Klein in the context of Congress’ intervention in the Terry Schiavo saga). See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525
(1998) (evaluating the relevance of Klein in our modern jurisprudence).
10 In prior cases, the Court had hesitated to even construe the Suspension Clause.
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001) (“The fact that this Court would
be required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is
in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be
raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”).
11 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D.D.C. 2008) (declining
to reach whether other constitutional provisions could be invoked by a Guantanamo
detainee facing trial by military commission).
12 As this article went to press, the D.C. district court concluded that at least three
noncitizens detained as enemy combatants in Afghanistan are also protected by the
Suspension Clause, relying heavily on Boumediene. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 061669, 2009 WL 863657 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009). In particular, Judge Bates concluded
that Boumediene’s logic necessarily extended to noncitizens captured outside of
Afghanistan who were not themselves citizens of Afghanistan. See id. at *22–23.
13 See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17–19
(D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting merits of petitioners’ challenges regarding the constitutional
adequacy of the conditions of their confinement).
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right to be released (into the United States) when there is nowhere
else to send those whom the government lacks the legal authority to
detain?14 Indeed, these questions are only a sampling; it will no doubt
be years before the direct implications of Boumediene are fully fleshed
out.15
My project in this Article is not to take up these necessarily fluid
questions of application, but to look more carefully at the implications
of the “quiet theory”16 underlying Justice Kennedy’s lengthy and complex opinion for the Boumediene majority. In particular, my focus is on
what we should take away from his repeated allusions to the relationship between habeas corpus and the separation of powers—a recurring (if surprising) theme of the seventy-page opinion, typified by
passages like the following:
The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by a
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It
ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the “delicate balance of governance” that is itself the surest safeguard of
liberty. The Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming
the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.
The separation-of-powers doctrine, and the history that influenced
its design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the Suspension Clause.17

14 After the D.C. Circuit decided in Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
that the government had no authority to detain Uighurs held as “enemy combatants”
at Guantanamo, Judge Urbina ordered their release into the United States. See In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2008). On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the federal courts are powerless to order
the detainees’ release into the United States, and that the result of such analysis (that
is, the Uighurs’ potentially indefinite detention) is not unconstitutional because the
Guantanamo detainees are not protected by the Due Process Clause. See Kiyemba v.
Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S.
Apr. 3, 2009) (No. 08-1234).
15 See, e.g., Jennifer Norako, Comment, Accuracy or Fairness?: The Meaning of
Habeas Corpus After Boumediene v. Bush and Its Implications on Alien Removal Orders, 58
AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that Boumediene’s analysis calls into question the constitutionality of the judicial review provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005,
which preclude access to habeas corpus for immigrants challenging their removal
orders).
16 I borrow this phrase from Justice Jackson, as relayed by my former colleague
Pat Gudridge. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933,
1959 (2003).
17 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) (citations omitted) (quoting
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
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The Boumediene majority opinion expressly invokes the separation
of powers in at least ten additional passages,18 even though the questions before the Court had to do with the geographic scope and substantive content of the Suspension Clause, and not with a more
general alleged violation of the separation of powers (as was the case
in Hamdan).19 Reading Boumediene, one is left with the distinct
impression that for Justice Kennedy, at least, the writ of habeas corpus
is in part a means to an end—a structural mechanism protecting individual liberty by preserving the ability of the courts to check the political branches.
Thus, at other points in Boumediene, Kennedy took pains to
emphasize that “the Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme,”20 that, per Alexander
Hamilton, “the writ preserves limited government,”21 and, perhaps
most pointedly, that “the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”22 As the
opinion concludes,
Security subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and
the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation
of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to
consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.
. . . Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few
exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the
responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to
imprison a person. Some of these petitioners have been in custody
for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention. Their access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not
obtain the relief they seek.23

In this respect, Justice Kennedy’s separation of powers focus is
reminiscent less of his opinions in the other War on Terrorism cases24
18 Id. at 2246–47, 2253, 2259, 2263, 2269–70, 2277, 2297–98, 2307.
19 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 & n.23 (2006) (rejecting the
argument that the President had the authority to convene military tribunals inconsistent with the scope of the statutory authorization that Congress had provided).
20 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
21 Id. at 2247 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
22 Id. at 2259.
23 Id. at 2277.
24 See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

\\server05\productn\N\NDL\84-5\NDL508.txt

2009]

unknown

BOUMEDIENE’s

Seq: 5

quiet theory

17-AUG-09

11:09

2111

than of his majority opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,25 where
the Court struck down part of a federal statute that prohibited legal
aid lawyers who received federal funding from challenging the validity
of existing welfare laws.26 Although the Velazquez Court concluded
that the spending restriction violated the First Amendment, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that such analysis was bolstered by the “severe
impairment of the judicial function” such a restriction might otherwise effect.27 In both cases, Justice Kennedy thereby suggested that
the injury the statute inflicted upon the role of the courts was at least
relevant, if not central, to the constitutional analysis.
Whereas some might view these passages in both Velazquez and
Boumediene as little more than rhetorical flourishes,28 it is difficult to
understand the crux of Kennedy’s analysis in the latter case—of why
the review available under the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA) of 200529 failed to provide an adequate alternative to the writ
of habeas corpus—without these first principles. At least where
habeas corpus is concerned, the purpose of judicial review, in Kennedy’s view, appears to be as much about preserving the role of the
courts as it is about protecting the individual rights of the litigants.
It was with this analytical imperative in mind that Justice Kennedy
disaggregated the access-to-courts question from the adequacy-of-theprocess question, suggesting that it is was neither necessary nor sufficient, in resolving whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) provided an adequate substitute to habeas corpus, to ask
25 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
26 Id. at 548–49.
27 Id. at 546; see also id. at 545 (“By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal
issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of
the judicial power. Congress cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its
source.”).
28 Indeed, two of the most sustained academic critiques to date of Boumediene
have taken a rather dismissive attitude toward the significance (and plausibility) of
Justice Kennedy’s separation-of-powers analysis. See Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and
the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 23
(“[O]n inspection it becomes clear that the real basis of the opinion lies elsewhere.”);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2039 (2009) (“[I]t is
Kafkaesque for the majority to invoke ‘separation of powers’ as a justification for dismantling two bulwarks of that doctrine, congressional control over federal jurisdiction and the political question doctrine.”).
29 Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
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whether their procedures comported with due process.30 Even
though Chief Justice Roberts argued vehemently in dissent that it was
illogical to reach the constitutionality of the removal of habeas jurisdiction without deciding whether individual petitioners had actually
been denied due process,31 Justice Kennedy held firm, reasoning that
the risk of error in CSRT proceedings was too high to trust that CSRT
appeals were an adequate alternative to habeas corpus.32
Its significance to the result in Boumediene notwithstanding, the
larger implications of Justice Kennedy’s analysis remain to be seen.
Only time will tell whether his not-unprecedented suggestion that
habeas corpus is about accuracy more than fairness will have implications for other forms of federal habeas corpus, including review of
state court convictions and of challenges to removal orders in immigration cases.33 But there is one piece of this puzzle that is ripe for
consideration now—namely, Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the
access to courts protected by the Suspension Clause is (at least largely)
about protecting the courts as such.
In nonhabeas cases, such a view is inconsistent with current case
law. As recently as 2002, the Court has noted that, “[h]owever unsettled the basis of the constitutional right of access to courts, our cases
rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying
claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being
30 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (“Even if we were to
assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards, it would not end our inquiry.”);
id. (“[W]e make no judgment as to whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards . . . .”).
31 See id. at 2280–83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
32 See, e.g., id. at 2270 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy thus invoked Justice
Holmes’ dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), suggesting that the purpose
of habeas corpus is to “ ‘cu[t] through all forms and g[o] to the very tissue of the
[constitutional] structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the
proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell.’ ” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270
(quoting Mangum, 237 U.S. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (first and second alterations in original)).
33 See, e.g., Norako, supra note 15. Indeed, this distinction harkens back to the
conflict in post-conviction habeas cases between Justice Brennan’s position in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which suggested that habeas was concerned solely with the
legality of detention “simpliciter,” id. at 430, and the “process” view first articulated by
Paul Bator, see generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing that institutional considerations support the invocation of federal habeas jurisdiction only when state
courts fail to provide a satisfactory process for deciding federal questions), and later
effectively adopted by the Supreme Court in a series of cases culminating in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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shut out of court.”34 Although those cases in particular concerned
access to the courts as a practical matter, the limited jurisprudence
with respect to Congress’ power to preclude judicial review reflects a
similar understanding—i.e., that a “serious constitutional question”
would arise only “if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.”35
At first blush, such logic seems entirely intuitive. Because federal
courts have jurisdiction to determine their jurisdiction,36 even the
most complete and unambiguous denial of access to the courts leaves
intact the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
such preclusion.37 Thus, courts can decide whether the affected litigants have substantive rights before deciding whether the physical or
substantive preclusion of judicial review is constitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment38 and its sweeping repudiation of “hypothetical
jurisdiction.”39 Because these cases hold that the “injury” inflicted by
the denial of access occurs only if the litigants do have rights on the
merits that courts are unable to vindicate, the consensus view preBoumediene seemed to be that there is simply no distinct separation of
powers issue in denial-of-access cases—that there is no injury to the

34 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (footnote omitted).
35 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291
(1947); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law
that a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).
37 See, e.g., Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[A]s an Article III court, we have inherent jurisdiction ‘to determine whether [a]
jurisdictional bar applies.’ ” (quoting Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir.
2004)).
38 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
39 Specifically, Steel Co. held that the federal courts have no power to assume the
existence of jurisdiction and decide a case on the merits, even where the result would
have been the same and the jurisdictional issue was far more complicated. See id. at
93–102. But see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,
430–31 (2007) (clarifying that Steel Co. does not preclude resolution of other threshold
issues). For present purposes, the relevant point is that resolving the “threshold”
jurisdictional question in jurisdiction-stripping cases necessarily involves resolving
constitutional challenges to statutes purportedly precluding jurisdiction. Cf. Schiavo
ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., specially
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining why Steel Co. requires
courts to decide as a threshold matter constitutional challenges to statutes conferring
jurisdiction).
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courts separate from, or even on top of, any injury to the individual
litigants.40
The origins of both classes of access claims, however, tell a rather
different story. With respect to the constitutional right of access to
the courts,41 the early cases, especially Ex parte Hull,42 “appear[ ] to
have been motivated more by notions of federalism and the power of
the federal courts than [by] the rights of prisoners.”43 Pointedly, the
stated justification for recognizing a right of access to the courts was to
ensure that courts (the federal courts, in particular) were the authoritative expositors of federal law.44
And at roughly the same time, as the Supreme Court was beginning to evoke the specter of what Louis Jaffe would later call the “right
to judicial review,”45 the key opinions focused as much on the institutional prerogative of the courts as on the rights of individual litigants.46 Emblematic of this trend was a 1936 concurrence by Justice
Brandeis, who emphasized that,
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to
have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was
applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that extent, the person asserting
40 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ridiculing
the idea that Guantanamo Bay detainees are protected by the separation of powers
even if they have no other constitutional rights).
41 There is substantial disagreement about the source of such a right. See, e.g.,
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (“Decisions of this Court have
grounded the right of access to courts in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”
(citations omitted)). See generally Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or
Immunity of National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477 (2008) (asserting that civil
litigants have a constitutionally protected right of access to federal courts by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
42 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
43 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 379 n.7 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
44 See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549 (“Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus
addressed to a federal court is properly drawn . . . [is a] question[ ] for that court
alone to determine.”).
45 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401,
769 (1958); see also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327
(1965) (“The ‘right’ to judicial review is determined by common-law tradition . . . , by
the statute book, and by the Constitution.”).
46 As Jaffe explains, this trend began in 1902 in American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), as a “presumption” in favor of judicial review, see
Jaffe, supra note 45, at 423–24, but did not crystallize until the aftermath of Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and its broad endorsement of administrative adjudication.
See Jaffe, supra note 45, at 800–08.

R
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a right, whatever its source, should be entitled to the independent
judgment of a court on the ultimate question of constitutionality.47

From Brandeis’ perspective, it was the protection of judicial
supremacy—of the courts’ prerogative to “say what the law is”48—that
required the protection of a litigant’s substantive access to the courts,
and not the other way around. Thus, at their origins, judicial recognition of both physical and substantive access claims was rationalized at
least largely by the courts’ need to protect themselves.
The real question, then, is not whether the denial of access was
ever understood at least in part as an injury to the horizontal or vertical separation of powers; as Parts I and II will demonstrate in reconstructing both sets of doctrine, it clearly was. Rather, the issues I take
up in this Article are why that formulation disappeared, and whether
the resuscitation of that understanding, beginning perhaps with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene, has any contemporary significance. Put another way, other than as an interesting footnote, does
the separation of powers have a meaningful contribution to make to
our understanding of how the Constitution limits the power of the
political branches to deny access to the courts?
In Part III, I turn to that question, using Boumediene as a foil.
Focusing on the divide between Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts, I suggest that the answer is yes—that recognition of the distinct injury that the courts (the federal courts, in particular) suffer in
denial-of-access cases helps fill in some of the gaps in extant doctrine.
More fundamentally, though, the notion that courts are harmed separately from the litigants in such cases also provides the jumping-off
point for reconsidering a host of federal courts doctrines relating to
the availability of Article III appellate review, and the broader—and far
more obscure—question of whether a right to judicial review is, and
should ever be, a right to federal judicial review.
I. PHYSICAL ACCESS

TO THE

COURTS: ORIGINS

AND

EVOLUTION

A. Origins: Ex Parte Hull and the Equal Access Cases
Especially as of late, the Supreme Court has been sharply divided
over the scope of the constitutional right of access to the courts.49
There is no disagreement, however, that its roots lay in the Court’s
47 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
49 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 344 (1996) (dividing 5-4 on the scope of
the right of access to the courts).
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terse 1941 decision in Ex parte Hull. Hull, an “original” habeas petition,50 raised the question whether state officials—in Hull, a prison
warden—could impose a pre-clearance requirement on federal postconviction habeas petitions, requiring inmates to have their claims
screened by state officials prior to filing.51 In a short opinion, the
Supreme Court unanimously struck down the Michigan warden’s policy, holding that,
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal
court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are
questions for that court alone to determine.52

For this proposition, Justice Murphy cited four cases—the
Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in First National Bank v. Anderson,53
Erie Railroad Co. v. Purdy,54 and Carter v. Texas;55 and the Federal District Court of Kansas’ decision in Ex parte Sharp.56 Yet, as Justice
Thomas would later note, the three Supreme Court cases, none of
which involved habeas petitions, all concerned the (by then) entirely
uncontroversial proposition that a state court’s determination of
whether a complaint states a federal question neither binds the
Supreme Court nor precludes it from exercising its appellate jurisdiction to decide the same.57
50 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring)
(“Such a petition is commonly understood to be ‘original’ in the sense of being filed
in the first instance in this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this Court’s appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction.” (citing Dallin H.
Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.
153)); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and
Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1511–15 (2007) (summarizing the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s “original” habeas jurisdiction).
51 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547–49 (1941) (describing the background and
the pre-clearance requirement).
52 Id. at 549.
53 269 U.S. 341, 346 (1926).
54 185 U.S. 148, 152 (1902).
55 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
56 33 F. Supp. 464 (D. Kan. 1940).
57 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 379 n.7 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Such a result should have necessarily followed from Justice Story’s opinion in Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), although the issue may not have
been fully settled until Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1958) (reaffirming that the
legislative and executive branches of state governments are bound to follow the
Supreme Court’s decisions on the U.S. Constitution). See generally Frederic M. Bloom,
Cooper’s Quiet Demise (A Short Response to Professor Strauss), 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115
(2008) (discussing Cooper and its significance).
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Whereas the fourth case cited by Murphy—Ex parte Sharp—did
raise the similar issue of interference by state prison officials with a
prisoner’s ability to perfect his appeal, the district court decision
relied on no prior authority for the proposition that such interference
warranted federal habeas relief.58 Instead, and tellingly, the precedents on which the Hull Court relied all went to the importance of the
Supreme Court having the final say on questions of federal law.59
Hull’s departure from the prior case law suggested that a state
executive official’s determination of federal law—in Hull, whether the
habeas petitioner had a viable claim—is similarly incapable of precluding federal review. Even though the Court ultimately denied
Hull’s habeas petition on the merits,60 it established the proposition
that state executive officials could not condition a litigant’s access to
the federal courts on their approval of the suit when such access is
otherwise available.
As importantly, to whatever extent Hull identified a textual
source or precedent for the constitutional principle it enunciated,
that principle was based upon the power of the federal courts vis-à-vis
the political branches, and not the rights of individual litigants. In
context, such analysis seems compelling, since the objection to the
Michigan procedure was that the warden was substituting his own
interpretation of the viability of petitioners’ federal habeas claims for
that of the federal courts. Access to the courts, then, was to protect
the federal courts’ authority to decide for themselves the viability of a
federal claim, a principle that implicated both the individual rights of
the litigant and the separation of powers (or, at least, principles of
“federalism”) between the federal courts and the states.
Notwithstanding the significance it would come to have in retrospect, Hull was largely neglected by the Supreme Court for several
decades, cited only in passing,61 or for the separate and entirely unrelated proposition that habeas could be available in some cases to
review a second or successive conviction even if the prisoner would
58 See Sharp, 33 F. Supp. at 466.
59 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 346 (1926) (“Whether a
pleading sets up a sufficient right of action or defense, grounded on the Constitution
or a law of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law; and where a case
coming from a state court presents that question, this court must determine for itself
the sufficiency of the allegations displaying the right or defense, and is not concluded
by the view taken of them by the state court.”).
60 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 550–51 (1941) (holding that Hull had procedurally defaulted).
61 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 n.24 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.1 (1945) (per curiam).
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not be released if he prevailed.62 At the same time, the Court in a
separate line of cases invoked the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the right of litigants to “equal” access to the courts, an issue that was particularly
implicated in lawsuits brought by indigent and/or illiterate criminal
defendants and prisoners.
In Griffin v. Illinois,63 for example, the Court struck down an Illinois law that required even indigent criminal defendants to pay for
trial transcripts in order to appeal.64 In Smith v. Bennett,65 the Court
invalidated an Iowa law that required indigent prisoners to pay a filing
fee in order to prosecute a habeas petition.66 In Douglas v. California,67 the Court rejected a California criminal procedure rule that
allowed the state courts to deny petitioners’ request for counsel if the
state courts concluded that the litigants’ claims were unmeritorious.68
And in Johnson v. Avery,69 the Court struck down a Tennessee regulation that prohibited inmates from assisting each other on legal matters, on the ground that the rule interfered with the ability of illiterate
or poorly educated prisoners to perfect their legal claims.70
Yet inasmuch as the equal access cases presupposed that the right
of access to the courts derived from the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, they struggled to articulate a coherent rationale that would support a generalized right of
access to the courts. On the contrary, as then-Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in Ross v. Moffitt71 in 1974,
The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases
has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Neither
Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result
reached, each depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes
different factors.72
62
54, 67
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
(1968).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
See id. at 19–20 (plurality opinion).
365 U.S. 708 (1961).
See id. at 713–14.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
See id. at 357–58.
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
See id. at 488–90.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 608–09 (footnote omitted).
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The Court would nevertheless expand the equal access rationale
later that same year, holding, in Wolff v. McDonnell,73 that Johnson also
precluded states from barring inmate assistance in the filing of civil
rights actions (and not just habeas petitions).74 At the same time, in
rejecting the petitioners’ separate claim in Wolff that the right of
access to the courts precluded prison officials from opening a prisoner’s correspondence with counsel, the Court emphasized that the
scope of any such right was unclear. In Justice White’s words, “the
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on access to the
courts has not been extended by this Court to apply further than protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint.”75
But Wolff, like the cases before it, did little to explain why those cases,
and only those cases, implicated the “fundamental” constitutional
right the existence of which the Court effectively took for granted.
B. Bounds v. Smith: Access to the Courts Redefined
To understand Bounds v. Smith,76 it is important first to describe a
case that came to the Supreme Court six years earlier—Younger v. Gilmore.77 In Gilmore, a group of inmates challenged the constitutionality
of a California regulation limiting the availability of materials in
prison libraries. After a three-judge district court panel struck down
the California regulation,78 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed,
noting only that it had jurisdiction,79 and that it “affirm[ed] the judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California,”
citing Johnson in support.80
Because Gilmore was a summary affirmance, it left the law at least
somewhat unsettled,81 resulting in a slew of irreconcilable (or at least
73 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
74 See id. at 577–80.
75 Id. at 576 (citations omitted); see also id. (“[E]ven if one were to accept the
argument that inspection of incoming mail from an attorney placed an obstacle to
access to the court, it is far from clear that this burden is a substantial one.”).
76 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
77 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
78 Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam) (threejudge court).
79 Gilmore, 404 U.S. at 15. As remains true today, the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction from three-judge district courts was mandatory, so long as the three-judge
district court itself properly had jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006); see also
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1967) (construing § 1253).
80 Gilmore, 404 U.S. at 15.
81 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784 n.5 (1983) (“[T]he precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than ‘the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions.’ A summary disposition affirms
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somewhat inconsistent) lower court decisions in the ensuing years.82
Then, in 1977, the Supreme Court attempted to make explicit what
Gilmore had implicitly established, concluding in Bounds that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”83
At issue in Bounds was the access to a law library afforded to
North Carolina state inmates, given that the only prison library in the
state was held to be “severely inadequate” and the state provided no
other legal assistance to inmates.84 Writing for a 6–3 Court, Justice
Marshall invoked the Court’s equal access jurisprudence for the proposition that “‘[m]eaningful access’ to the courts is the touchstone.”85
Although the Court had never explicitly recognized that meaningful
access could require the states to undertake an affirmative obligation,
Marshall argued that such a conclusion was not precluded by the earlier case law, and that “[t]he inquiry is . . . whether law libraries or
other forms of legal assistance are needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.”86 Thus, Bounds held that North
Carolina was obligated to provide prisoners with access to law libraries
or other “adequate” legal resources in order to enable the inmates to
press their legal claims in the federal courts through the preparation
and filing of “meaningful” legal papers.87
Concurring, Justice Powell emphasized that the majority opinion
“recognizes that a prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to
the courts to assert such procedural and substantive rights as may be
available to him under state and federal law.”88 At the same time,
Powell noted, the opinion did not identify the particular types of
only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than
was essential to sustain that judgment.” (quoting Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182 (1978))).
82 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828–29 (1977) (discussing the implications of Gilmore).
83 Id. at 828.
84 Id. at 818.
85 Id. at 823 (emphasis added) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611, 612,
615 (1974)). In an analogous context, the Court had held just one month before
Bounds that a statute displacing habeas corpus did not implicate the Suspension
Clause so long as the remedy it provided was an “adequate” and “effective” substitute
for habeas. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 379–84 (1977).
86 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
87 Id. at 828.
88 Id. at 833 (Powell, J., concurring).
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claims federal or state courts were constitutionally compelled to hear;
it merely held that prisoners had a right to an adequate law library or
comparable legal assistance when pressing such claims.89
Although separate dissents were penned by each of the Justices
(Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and then-Justice Rehnquist) in
the minority, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent was by far the most significant. At the heart of Rehnquist’s dissent was the (seemingly correct)
proposition that Bounds went further than any of the Court’s earlier
cases entirely because it was not about equal access. In his words,
[I]f a prisoner incarcerated pursuant to a final judgment of conviction is not prevented from physical access to the federal courts in
order that he may file therein petitions for relief which Congress
has authorized those courts to grant, he has been accorded the only
constitutional right of access to the courts that our cases have articulated in a reasoned way.90

On Justice Rehnquist’s view, the flaw in the majority opinion was
in recognizing that the right of access to the courts could be infringed
even when states took no affirmative action to preclude access.91 Such
a right, Rehnquist reasoned, had no relationship to the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses, and, at least according to Rehnquist, was
“found nowhere in the Constitution.”92 The error in Bounds was thus
in Justice Marshall’s conflation of the denial-of-access cases like Hull
with the equal access cases like Griffin. Even if one could find a
requirement for affirmative state action in the context of remedying
discriminatory policies, none of the Court’s prior precedents recognized any such affirmative requirement when the denial of access was,
for lack of a better word, nondiscriminatory.
Yet, regardless of who had the better of the argument, Bounds was
unquestionably an expansion of the Court’s earlier cases, and one that
crystallized the very question that prior precedent had left unanswered. Was the right of access to the courts a generalized and widely
sweeping right that existed to protect the ability of all litigants to press
all legal claims in all cases, or was it a narrower right that only prevented executive branch officials from affirmatively obstructing access
to the courts? Bounds clearly adopted the former reasoning, but pro-

89 Id.
90 See id. at 839–40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91 Id.; see also id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s conclusion in Gilmore, on which Bounds relied, as a “quantum jump” from the earlier case
law).
92 Id. at 839 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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vided policy arguments more than legal analysis in explaining why the
Constitution compelled such a result.
C. Lewis v. Casey and the Reconceived Origins of Access Claims
The next two decades saw concerted efforts by the Supreme
Court to clarify (and usually narrow) the scope of the right articulated
in Bounds93 and in Anders v. California.94 In Pennsylvania v. Finley,95 for
example, the Court held that states have broad discretion in determining the nature and type of legal assistance to provide to inmates seeking post-conviction remedies, and that Anders did not compel any
specific procedures, including a right to counsel for indigent
prisoners.96
Similarly, in Murray v. Giarratano,97 the Court reversed a lower
court decision that Bounds compelled appointed counsel for death
row inmates.98 Specifically, a plurality of the Court concluded that
Finley’s rejection of a right to counsel for an inmate’s collateral challenges to a conviction applied to death row inmates as well, notwithstanding Bounds or the extent to which counsel might be necessary to
protect those inmates’ access to the courts.99 Concurring, Justice
O’Connor emphasized that Bounds “allows the States considerable discretion in assuring that those imprisoned in their jails obtain meaningful access to the judicial process. Beyond the requirements of
Bounds, the matter is one of legislative choice based on difficult policy
consideration and the allocation of scare legal resources.”100
But the real mechanism through which the Court retreated from
Bounds was its standing doctrine, as exemplified dramatically by its
93 In this regard, the denial-of-access cases were part of a larger series of cases in
which the Rehnquist Court evinced an ever growing hostility to the private enforcement of public (and particularly civil) rights. See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting
Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003)
(detailing how the Rehnquist Judiciary advocated against investing federal courts with
obligations to enforce new rights); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (analyzing a number of areas where the Court has acted
aggressively to limit the availability of remedies and rights of action, assessing the
source of such hostility, and examining its effects on the Court’s docket).
94 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
95 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
96 See id. at 559.
97 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
98 See id. at 11 (plurality opinion).
99 See id. at 7–11.
100 Id. at 13 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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1996 decision in Lewis v. Casey.101 At issue in Casey was a class action
filed by twenty-two Arizona inmates on behalf of all inmates in the
Arizona state prison system, which challenged various aspects of the
adequacy of Arizona’s prison libraries.102 The district court sustained
the challenge, finding that the libraries were inadequate in providing
legal assistance to inmates, particularly with respect to prisoners in
lockdown (who were denied physical access) and to illiterate or nonEnglish-speaking prisoners (who were unlikely to receive any assistance from library staff).103 The court issued an injunction requiring
Arizona to undertake a massive overhaul of its prison libraries,104 a
decision that the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed on appeal.105
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to show the type of systematic injury that would
justify the relief fashioned by the district court.106 Specifically, Justice
Scalia noted that,
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to
a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant
actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or
legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That
would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary.
Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned . . . the
inmate . . . must go one step further and demonstrate that the
alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.107

In other words, the right of access to the courts required some
showing that the denial of access had actually precluded the plaintiff
from adequately presenting his legal claims—that the plaintiff’s ability
to vindicate his substantive rights was undermined by the denial of
access. Although the majority agreed that two of the named plaintiffs
had made such a showing, it held that the injunction was massively
overbroad in requiring structural changes to the Arizona prison
library system in response.108
101 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
102 Id. at 346.
103 See Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1553, 1569 (D. Ariz. 1992); see also Casey, 518
U.S. at 346–47 (summarizing the district court’s holdings).
104 Casey, 834 F. Supp. at 1569.
105 See Lewis v. Casey, 43 F.3d 1261, 1270–72 (9th Cir. 1994).
106 Casey, 518 U.S. at 359–60.
107 Casey, 518 U.S. at 351.
108 See id. at 360 (“Apart from the dismissal of Bartholic’s claim with prejudice,
and Harris’s inability to file his claim, there is no finding, and as far as we can discern
from the record no evidence, that in Arizona prisons illiterate prisoners cannot
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Concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment, Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg took issue with Justice Scalia’s characterization of the relationship between standing and
the merits for the two plaintiffs who clearly did allege an actual injury.
On their view, the majority overreached in suggesting that there could
never be a structural injunction based upon Bounds on the theory
advanced by the plaintiffs; the facts in Casey, though, simply did not
support a contrary result.109
For present purposes, what is most striking about Casey is the
extent to which the separation of powers resurfaced as a relevant issue
in denial-of-access cases. Yet, in marked contrast to Hull, which styled
the purpose of an access-based right as protecting the federal courts
from state executive branch officials, the majority in Casey styled the
focus on standing as protecting state executive branch officials from the
courts.110 In his telling concurrence, Justice Thomas was at pains to
emphasize that “[p]rinciples of federalism and separation of powers
dictate that exclusive responsibility for administering state prisons
resides with the State and its officials.”111 Justice Thomas thus proceeded to cleave the equal access cases from the denial-of-access cases,
noting that the Court had never suggested the right identified in Hull
could impose an affirmative obligation upon the states.112 Indeed, as
noted above, Thomas read Hull as not turning in any meaningful way
on the rights of the litigants, but on the relationship between the
courts and the political branches, and between the federal government and the states.113
Oddly, then, Casey, although relying upon the plaintiffs’ ability
(or lack thereof) to prove an underlying injury on the merits, was a
case largely about reining in the right of access to the courts in order
to protect the separation of powers. Casey might thereby suggest, however implicitly, that the separation of powers is a more useful framework in the abstract for understanding both why a generalized right of
access to the courts is necessary, and what limits it might necessarily
include. But the majority in Casey saw that issue as a one-way ratchet.
obtain the minimal help necessary to file particular claims that they wish to bring
before the courts.”).
109 See id. at 393–404 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
110 See id. at 349 (“The requirement that an inmate . . . must show actual injury
derives . . . from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents
courts of law from undermining tasks assigned to the political branches.”).
111 Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 379.
113 See id. at 379 n.7.
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The separation of powers and federalism limited the courts, and did
not thereby empower the courts.
In the short term, the impact of Casey can be seen quite clearly in
Christopher v. Harbury,114 the Court’s most recent denial-of-access case.
At issue in Harbury was the claim that a government cover-up had frustrated the ability of Jennifer Harbury, a U.S. citizen, to prosecute a
damages claim against the U.S. government for its alleged role in the
detention, torture, and execution of Harbury’s husband, a Guatemalan dissident, by the Guatemalan army.115 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Souter concluded that Harbury had failed to allege a
viable remedy that the alleged cover-up could have precluded her
from pursuing.116 In summarizing the extant case law, Souter succinctly characterized the relationship, after Casey, between standing
and denial-of-access claims:
Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be
gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing
any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong. However unsettled the basis of the constitutional right of access to
courts, our cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to
the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered
injury by being shut out of court.117

Thus, notwithstanding the extent to which denial of access, at its
origins, was defined at least largely by reference to the role of the
federal courts in interpreting federal law, the subsequent case law
inverted the inquiry, turning denial-of-access claims into questions
principally—if not entirely—about the litigant’s underlying rights.
Today, whether a litigant has unconstitutionally been denied access to
the courts turns entirely on whether there is a colorable legal question
for the courts to decide, and so the issue of whether the denial of
access might separately injure the courts has been rendered entirely
superfluous, even while the constitutional foundations and scope of
the right have remained unclear.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT

TO

JUDICIAL REVIEW

In marked contrast to the constitutional right of access to the
courts discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has never formally rec114 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
115 See id. at 406–08 (summarizing the background and allegations); see also
Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 415–16 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same).
116 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 405.
117 Id. at 414–15 (footnote omitted).
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ognized a general constitutional right of substantive access to the
courts—what Professor Jaffe described as the “right to judicial
review,”118 and what might better be understood as a right of access to
a judicial forum for resolution of legal (or at least constitutional)
claims.119 Nevertheless, as noted above, the Court has repeatedly
invoked the “serious constitutional question” that would arise if an act
of Congress were interpreted as precluding all judicial review of “colorable constitutional claims,” suggesting that even outside the context
of habeas corpus, the Constitution might protect such a right.120 And
in the various modern decisions invoking this form of the constitutional avoidance canon, the cited authorities all trace back to the
same foundational cases.
Thus, whereas Part I painstakingly summarized the evolution of
the constitutional right of access to the courts by reference to the
body of law expositing and defining such a right, Part II is, out of
necessity, far less concrete or definite. Instead of retracing the origins
of the right to judicial review, Part II attempts to retrace the origins of
the idea that there is a right to judicial review, and the instances where
that idea triggered invocation of the constitutional avoidance canon,
before moving on to the unique and special case of federal habeas
corpus.
A. The Origins of the “Right” to Judicial Review
Of course, any discussion of judicial review must begin no later
than, if not before, Marbury v. Madison.121 But as Professor Jaffe
cogently argued a half-century ago, the true origins of the Ameri118 See generally Jaffe, supra note 45 (analyzing the role of judicial review in the
governmental process and arguing that judicial review of administrative action should
be presumptively available).
119 As I explain below, even the Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush striking
down a jurisdiction-stripping statute as unconstitutionally denying access to the
courts, was focused on the habeas-specific access right protected by the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause, and not a more general right to judicial review of a constitutional
claim.
120 See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1973) (raising these questions before seeking to avoid them through statutory construction).
121 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). There have been a series of recent arguments
that judicial review predated Marbury. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial
Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 456–57 (2005) (summarizing recent
debate on the topic). The contemporary debate notwithstanding, it is certainly true
that the principle of judicial review was established at least by the time Marbury was
decided.

R
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can122 “right” to judicial review can be traced to a series of early twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions imposing a “presumption” in
favor thereof.123
First among these cases was the Court’s 1902 decision in American
School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,124 which raised the propriety
of a decision by the Postmaster General barring the plaintiff from conducting business through the mail. The Postmaster General, who had
determined that the plaintiff’s advertisements were fraudulent,
argued that his actions were entirely “administrative,” and were therefore not properly subject to judicial review.125 The Supreme Court
disagreed, concluding that the delegation of authority to the Postmaster General “does not necessarily and always oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant relief to a party aggrieved . . . .”126 Instead, “[t]he acts
of all . . . officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official
violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have
jurisdiction to grant relief.”127
McAnnulty did not settle the question of whether the Constitution
required judicial review in certain cases, but it did give rise to what Jaffe
described as the “presumption of reviewability”—the principle that
administrative interpretations of federal law would be subject to judicial review absent clear indication of congressional intent to the con122 Jaffe traced the origins of judicial review (and of a potential right thereto) to
early English common law, as surveyed first in Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson,
Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1956), and in
somewhat less detail in JAFFE, supra note 45, at 327–34.
123 See Jaffe, supra note 45, at 423–37. As Jaffe notes, prior to 1902, a series of late
nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions had suggested, often implicitly, that at
least some administrative law claims could be made unreviewable. See id. at 421–23.
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing to gain from administrative law
prior to the turn of the twentieth century. On the contrary, Professor Jerry Mashaw is
in the midst of an immensely significant project reconstructing the administrative law
of the early Republic, taking issue with the classical view that administrative law only
“began” with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. See Jerry
L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); Jerry
L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the
Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007). Whatever significance we may
attach to the implications of Mashaw’s work, it seems fairly clear that the Court did
not begin viewing widespread administrative adjudication as a threat to judicial
supremacy until the period Jaffe describes.
124 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
125 See id. at 109–10 (restating the position of the Postmaster General).
126 Id. at 108.
127 Id.

R
R
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trary.128 Presumably, the basis for the clear statement rule was a
concern that the preclusion of review would raise a constitutional
question, although the McAnnulty Court did not expressly state as
much. And although the Court did not actually articulate such a presumption (or hint at the problems the absence of review might raise)
until the 1930s, a series of cases over the ensuing decades reinforced
the Court’s concern with the increasing drift of interpretive authority
to administrative agencies.129
As Jaffe would later write, “[t]he presumption of reviewability was
reinforced in the twenties and thirties by a judicial zeal, often excessive, to contain administrative action.”130 As importantly, the Court’s
concern was not motivated by a perceived need to protect an individual litigant’s right to have an Article III court provide a definitive
answer to a question of federal law, but by the possibility that the burgeoning administrative state would frustrate the courts’ power to have
the final say.131 Thus, the concern implicated by the ever-increasing
number of statutes delegating adjudicative authority to administrative
agencies was not so much that agencies would have the first opportunity to interpret federal law, but that they would have the last, as well.
B. Judicial Review and the Modern Administrative State
Nowhere was this concern more powerfully presented than in
Crowell v. Benson,132 which has been described as the “fountainhead
for the stream of cases legitimating the role of the modern administrative agency.”133 As Professor Fallon has summarized,
In upholding Congress’s decision to vest responsibility for deciding
cases under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in an administrative agency, Crowell . . . acknowledged a
distinction between public rights and private rights; the Court
assumed that public rights disputes may not require judicial decision at either the original or appellate level. . . . Even in private
rights cases, Crowell held, an administrative tribunal may make findings of fact and render an initial decision of legal and constitutional
questions, as long as there is adequate review in a constitutional
128 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 45, at 423–27.
129 For a representative sampling, see id. at 425–28.
130 Id. at 428.
131 See, e.g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (“The responsibility of
determining the limits of statutory grants of authority . . . is a judicial function . . . .”).
132 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
133 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at
51).
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court. For the use of administrative decisionmakers to be permissible in a private rights case, Crowell posited that the “essential attributes” of the judicial decision must remain in an article III
enforcement court, with the administrative agency or other nonarticle III adjudicator functioning less as an independent decisionmaker than as an adjunct to the court.134

But irrespective of the debate over the extent to which Crowell
authorized the administrative determination of factual issues in “private rights” cases,135 Chief Justice Hughes was almost dismissive of the
concern that the statute arrogated the courts’ authority to interpret
federal law, noting simply that “[r]ulings of the deputy commissioner
upon questions of law are without finality.”136 It simply was beyond
the pale of the questions presented in Crowell whether Congress could
preclude the federal courts from overturning an executive branch
official’s interpretation of federal law. Moreover, the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority as between agencies and courts was,
according to Chief Justice Hughes, entirely tied to the proper separation of powers, and not to the individual rights of the litigants.137
Four years later, when the Court was first asked to substantially
clarify the scope of Crowell and the extent to which it did or did not
require independent record review by the courts, the separation of
powers concern was made ever more concrete. In a thorough concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,138 Justice Brandeis—who had dissented in Crowell on the ground that he thought
deference even to determinations of constitutional fact was permissible
under the Longshoreman’s Act139—attempted to explain why the
134 Id. at 923–24 (footnotes omitted).
135 For a summary of the debate and further citations, see Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86
GEO. L.J. 2589, 2606 n.89 (1998).
136 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 45; see also id. at 46 (“[T]he statute contains no express
limitation attempting to preclude the court, in proceedings to set aside an order as
not in accordance with law, from making its own examination and determination of
facts whenever that is deemed to be necessary to enforce a constitutional right properly asserted.”).
137 See id. at 56 (“It is . . . a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal
judicial power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions. It is the
question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the
judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency—in this
instance a single deputy commissioner—for the final determination of the existence
of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen
depend.” (footnote omitted)).
138 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
139 See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 77–80 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Court could completely defer to an agency’s factual determinations,
but not to its legal conclusions:
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was
applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that extent, the person asserting
a right, whatever its source, should be entitled to the independent
judgment of a court on the ultimate question of constitutionality.140

Decades of administrative law cases and scholarship would debate
(and have debated) the margins of the distinctions Crowell and St.
Joseph Stock Yards presupposed. But Brandeis’ defense of the significance of judicial review of questions of law provided a powerful principle (and, subsequently, perhaps the formative moment in the
development of a right to judicial review). Indeed, decades later,
when the Supreme Court would note the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by the complete preclusion of judicial
review, Brandeis’ concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards became the citation most commonly invoked in support of that conclusion.141
C. Battaglia and the Academic Misunderstanding
Arguably, though, the focal point of the movement toward a
“right” to judicial review ultimately had nothing to do with the rise of
the modern administrative state. Instead, the canonical enunciation
of a due process-based right to judicial review appears to have arisen
out of an extended battle between Congress and the Supreme Court
over the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).142
Specifically, the dispute was triggered by a trio of Supreme Court
decisions in 1944, 1945, and 1946, holding that the “work week” for
140 St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 84 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). On questions of fact, per his dissent in Crowell, Brandeis was more
circumspect:
If there be any [factual] controversy to which the judicial power extends that
may not be subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against
the diminution of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but
because, under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due
process is a requirement of judicial process.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
141 See, e.g., Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 n.8
(1974) (same).
142 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)).
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miners included the time traveling from the mouth of the mine to the
drill site (from “portal-to-portal”), and that, as such, thousands of miners were entitled to significant overtime pay under the FLSA.143 As
one recent summary recounts,
This produced a colossal private and public liability for retroactive
pay of over $6.5 billion. (The United States would have been liable
for $1.5 billion of that under cost-plus contracts.) Congress
responded with a heavy hand in the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,
wiping out the entire liability. That alone raised two grave constitutional issues: a takings and due process question and an attempt by
the legislative branch to deprive a judgment of the Supreme Court
of effect, in effect “reversing” the Court by statute. But in addition,
it put teeth in the substantive provisions by further specifying that
no federal court (including the Supreme Court) had jurisdiction of
any proceeding to enforce liability under the FLSA for portal-toportal pay.144

Thus, in section 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act,145 Congress provided that,
No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have
jurisdiction of any action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to
or on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under [FLSA] . . . to the
extent that such action [seeks to enforce rights withdrawn by sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Act].146

In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,147 the Second Circuit suggested that section 2(d)’s preclusion of judicial review might raise a
grave constitutional question, holding that “the exercise by Congress
of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”148 Thus, “while Congress has
143 See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (requiring that
time spent walking “from time clock to work bench” be included in compensable
working time); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of
Am., 325 U.S. 161, 170 (1945) (classifying underground travel in coal mines as compensable); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 603
(1944) (same result for iron ore mines).
144 William M. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. LITIG.
641, 693 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
145 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 251–254 (2006)).
146 Id. § 2(d), 61 Stat. at 86 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 252(d)).
147 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
148 Id. at 257.
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the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of
courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that
power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or to take private property without just
compensation.”149
Ultimately, Battaglia concluded that section 2(d) did not violate
the Due Process Clause, because Congress changed the applicable
substantive law while the plaintiffs’ claims were pending, and because
the statute did not purport to disturb judgments that had previously
become final.150 Put another way, Battaglia concluded that the divestiture of jurisdiction had not actually precluded a meritorious claim,
because the provisions wiping out all liability were in fact constitutional—the underlying substantive claims were ultimately meritless.
But Battaglia’s significance was as much for the theory it
advanced: that the Due Process Clause could constrain Congress’
power over federal jurisdiction. Moreover, Battaglia suggested a
model for how courts could decide such cases: first reach the question
whether the underlying legal claim has merit, and only then reach the
possible unconstitutionality of the foreclosure of jurisdiction.
As a result, Battaglia’s influence was immediately felt in the academy. Although seventy-five years had passed since United States v.
Klein151 provided the first example of the “external restraints” thesis—
that Congress cannot take away jurisdiction as means to a constitutionally impermissible end152—Battaglia provided a far less obtuse (and
far more accessible) conception of the limits on Congress’ jurisdiction-stripping power. Moreover, Battaglia was decided in the nascence
of a profound academic reassessment of the relationship between
Congress and the federal courts. As Professor Amar has explained,
the early 1950s “appear as . . . ‘the golden age’ of federal jurisdiction
and legal process scholarship.”153 In the context of such a sweeping
pedagogical revolution focused on the centrality of process, the idea

149 Id.
150 See id. at 259–61; see also Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co. Shipbuilding Div., 168
F.2d 58, 65 (4th Cir. 1948) (“Whether the denial of jurisdiction would be valid if the
provision striking down the claims were invalid is a question which does not arise.”).
151 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
152 See id. at 145–48; see also supra note 9 (citing sources).
153 Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988)); see also id. at 692 & nn.15–28 (citing articles representative of
the period).
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that the Constitution might itself limit Congress’ power to prescribe
(and proscribe) process would have reverberated rather loudly.154
Emblematic of the significance of the Portal-to-Portal Act issue
(and the Second Circuit’s resolution thereof) was Battaglia’s inclusion, first in Henry Hart’s legendary Dialectic,155 and shortly thereafter
in the first edition of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System.156 Famously, Hart equivocated at the end of the Dialectic
on whether Congress could completely preclude jurisdiction in
nonhabeas cases.157 But Battaglia’s inclusion in the conversation was
nevertheless significant, for it provided what was, to date, the most
compelling explanation for how the Constitution might limit Congress’ power over the courts in such suits.
D. The Rise of Avoidance and Further Obfuscations
It would not be until over two decades later, however, in Johnson
v. Robison,158 that the Supreme Court first invoked what has been
described as the “Battaglia principle,” i.e., that an act of Congress precluding all judicial review might raise serious constitutional questions.
The specific issue in Robison was whether a statute purporting to
preclude judicial review of particular decisions by the Administrator
of the Veterans Administration could constitutionally be applied to
preclude a lawsuit by a conscientious objector challenging the Administrator’s denial of educational benefits on both First and Fifth
Amendment grounds.159 In one sentence (and a footnote), the Court
noted that such a reading of the statute would “raise serious questions
concerning the constitutionality of [the statute],”160 and, invoking the
constitutional avoidance canon, adopted an alternative interpretation
that favored review.161
154 Indeed, it was during this exact period that courts and commentators were
struggling with the question of whether individuals in U.S. custody overseas were entitled to judicial process, a dilemma that raised many of the same tensions. See generally
Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV.
587 (1949) (evaluating problems relating to the extent of federal jurisdiction over
cases arising in military tribunals overseas).
155 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1383–84 & n.67 (1953).
156 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 302 (1st ed. 1953).
157 See Hart, supra note 155, at 1398–99.
158 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
159 Id. at 364–65.
160 Id. at 366.
161 See id. at 366–67 & n.8.
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The footnote is perhaps even more telling than the text. For the
proposition that the preclusion of all review would raise a “serious
constitutional question,” the Court cited Ex parte McCardle162 and Sheldon v. Sill,163 on the one hand (presumably against that idea),164 and
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee165 and Brandeis’ St. Joseph Stock Yards concurrence on the other.166 But the Court went no further, leaving for
another day the separate but related questions of why there might be a
serious constitutional question, and under which circumstances the
question would be implicated.
Just one year later, the Court returned to the same principle in
Weinberger v. Salfi,167 invoking the availability of jurisdiction under the
Social Security Act for constitutional challenges thereto as preempting
the serious constitutional question identified in Robison.168 To similar
effect, in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,169 the Court
interpreted the Medicare Act as not precluding challenges to the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ administration of Part B of the
Medicare Program.170 As Justice Stevens wrote, “[o]ur disposition
avoids the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if we construed § 1395ii to deny a judicial forum for constitutional claims arising under Part B of the Medicare program.”171 Interestingly, Bowen
162 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
163 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
164 The problem with both McCardle and Sill, of course, is that neither of the statutes upheld by the Supreme Court ousted all jurisdiction. In Sill, the litigants were
free to return to state court since federal jurisdiction had only been premised on
diversity. And in McCardle, the Court famously hinted that the repeal of its appellate
jurisdiction had not altered its “original” habeas jurisdiction under section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515 (“The act of 1868 does
not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the
act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”). The
Court would seize on this point less than seven months later, sustaining its original
habeas jurisdiction over a similar habeas petition in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
85, 103–06 (1869). For more on the relationship between these cases, see Hart, supra
note 155, at 1364–65 & n.14. See also Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three
Acts: A Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 642–46 (2006) (discussing the present-day significance of McCardle as authority for limitations on appellate
jurisdiction).
165 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
166 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 82–84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
167 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
168 See id. at 761–62.
169 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
170 See id. at 680–81.
171 Id. at 681 n.12.
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cited Salfi and Robison, but did not identify the origins of the requirement that the claims be constitutional.
But the most thorough articulation of the basis for the “serious
constitutional question” came two years later in Webster v. Doe.172 Webster concerned a lawsuit brought by a former employee of the CIA who
claimed he was unconstitutionally terminated on the ground of sexual
orientation.173 Although the Court concluded that the National
Security Act vested discretion in the Director of the CIA sufficient to
frustrate judicial review, it nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff’s
constitutional claims were not precluded.174 As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court,
We do not think § 102(c) may be read to exclude review of constitutional claims. We emphasized in Johnson v. Robison that where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its
intent to do so must be clear. In Weinberger v. Salfi, we reaffirmed
that view. We require this heightened showing in part to avoid the
“serious constitutional question” that would arise if a federal statute
were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.175

Webster thus became the typical and routine citation for the proposition that a statute taking away all judicial review of a “colorable
constitutional claim” would raise a “serious constitutional question.”176 But why only constitutional claims? What is the textual constitutional basis for the infirmity such a statute might create? How
would we ever begin answering that question, if congressional intent to
force the issue were clear? Over twenty years after Webster, these questions remain unanswered, largely—if not entirely—because of the
rigid constitutional avoidance that Webster and its predecessors necessarily precipitated.
E. An Attempt at Clarity: Schor and Non-article III Courts
Shortly after Webster, the Supreme Court was finally confronted
with a case where the question of whether the Constitution protected
172 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
173 Id. at 595–96.
174 Id. at 603.
175 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 681 n.12). For the “colorable” requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Bowen, which had rejected the government’s argument that it could dismiss the constitutional claims there at issue on
grounds of frivolity. Id.
176 See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 495
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Webster, 486 U.S. at 603); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993) (citing Webster, 486 U.S. at 603–04).
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a right to Article III adjudication per se was squarely and unequivocally presented. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,177
the Court was faced with the question of whether Congress could confer jurisdiction upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) over state-law counterclaims.178 Just four years earlier, a plurality of the Court had invalidated substantial aspects of the federal
bankruptcy system on the ground that Congress had delegated too
much authority over state law claims to non-Article III bankruptcy
courts,179 holding that “Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate
review.”180
Writing for a majority in Schor, Justice O’Connor stepped back
from Northern Pipeline, holding that the delegation of adjudicatory
authority to the CFTC was permissible, and did not violate either Article III or the separation of powers more generally. In so holding, Justice O’Connor began with the observation that “Article III, § 1, serves
both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided [by] judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government.’”181 Noting
that the latter concern “serves to protect primarily personal, rather
than structural, interests,”182 Justice O’Connor concluded that the
Article III-based right to an independent Article III adjudication was
subject to waiver, and had in fact been waived by Schor when he
expressly demanded that the counterclaim be resolved in the administrative proceeding.183
As to the separation of powers issue, Justice O’Connor emphasized the extent to which “Article III, § 1, safeguards the role of the
Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional
attempts ‘to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the
177 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
178 Id. at 835–36.
179 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
180 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985) (citing
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84, 90–92).
181 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting first Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583, then United States
v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
182 Id.
183 See id. at 848–49. Justice O’Connor further concluded that even if Schor had
not expressly waived such a right, he had effectively so waived by proceeding in the
CFTC in the first place. See id. at 849–50.
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purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts, and thereby preventing ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.’”184 Noting that the Court had previously
declined to adopt formalistic rules delineating the limits on Congress’
power to delegate adjudicatory authority to non-Article III courts, Justice O’Connor framed the issue as a balancing test:
Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent to
which the “essential attributes of judicial power” are reserved to
Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of
the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress
to depart from the requirements of Article III.185

Reasoning that those considerations balanced in favor of the delegation of authority to the CFTC (largely by analogizing the statutory
scheme to the one upheld in Crowell),186 Justice O’Connor concluded
that “the congressional authorization of limited CFTC jurisdiction
over a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the
CFTC’s primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not
create a substantial threat to the separation of powers.”187 Critically,
in support of this point, Justice O’Connor emphasized that Article III
review remained available, and that the administrative process was
triggered by the parties’ consent. Thus,
Congress gave the CFTC the authority to adjudicate such matters,
but the decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties
and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these
matters is unaffected. In such circumstances, separation of powers
concerns are diminished, for it seems self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court or resort
to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the separation of
powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism
through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve
their differences.188

In short, then, Schor actually reinforced the conclusion that the
separation of powers itself protected against over-delegation of Article
III adjudicatory authority to administrative agencies, even while
184 Id. at 850 (quoting first Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-Water Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 644 (1949), then Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
185 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting first Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584, then Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84–85).
186 See id. at 852–53.
187 Id. at 854.
188 Id. at 855.
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upholding the delegation there at issue. If the absence of a separation of powers problem turned on the conclusion that “the power of
the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters [wa]s unaffected,”189 then Schor appears unequivocally to bolster the suggestion
that, at least in the administrative law context, access to the courts was
as much about the courts as it was about the litigants.
Just as the nuances within Justice Brandeis’ logic have receded
over time, so too have we neglected Justice O’Connor’s uncontested
assertion that both individual rights and the separation of powers are
impacted when Congress constrains Article III review190—and Justice
Brennan’s suggestion that we can’t understand one without the
other.191 Instead, in recent years, the focus of courts and commentators has been directed much more to the litigants whose rights are at
issue, as most of the significant cases have arisen in the context of
Congress’ newfound obsession with federal habeas jurisdiction for
immigrants and for noncitizens held abroad—two classes of litigants
whose substantive rights may differ, in important ways, from traditional plaintiffs.
F. The Special Case of Habeas Corpus
Unlike the generalized due process-based right to judicial review
invoked in the Webster line of cases, the right to judicial review in the
context of habeas corpus is, at least at its core, far better established.
For decades, the Supreme Court has understood the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause as protecting the ability of individuals in state or
federal custody to challenge the legality of their detention under federal law, even if that detention is incident to a facially valid criminal
conviction.192
Moreover, as has been discussed elsewhere,193 habeas is different
in another important respect—thanks to the Supreme Court’s deci189 Id.
190 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brandeis’ views);
see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s views).
191 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“[Habeas] bring[s] into question the legality of a person’s restraint and [requires]
justification for such detention.”); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942)
(holding that habeas corpus permits a challenge to a valid conviction obtained without regard for the accused’s constitutional rights). For a brief summary of the evolution of habeas, see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996).
193 See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92
MINN. L. REV. 265 (2007) (surveying the availability of federal habeas relief in state
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sion in Tarble’s Case,194 it is one of the exceedingly few examples of a
federal cause of action that state courts are powerless to entertain.195
And although the analytical basis for the result in Tarble is unclear (at
best), its continuing force is beyond question.196
As a result, and unlike for most constitutional claims, the preclusion of federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions is the preclusion of
judicial review en toto. At the time Tarble’s Case was decided, this result
was unproblematic, since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867197 had
extended the jurisdiction of the federal courts over habeas petitions
“to their constitutional limit.”198 But beginning in 1996, attempts by
Congress to constrain the scope of habeas corpus gave rise to a series
of difficult constitutional questions—finally confronted in
Boumediene.199
First, in Felker v. Turpin,200 the Court sidestepped whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996201 violated the Suspension Clause in removing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the courts of appeals in certain habeas
cases.202 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that AEDPA did not force the constitutional question,
because the statute had not completely ousted the Court’s appellate
courts in the antebellum era and the Court’s rejection of such authority in a pair of
decisions bookending the Civil War).
194 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
195 See id. at 411 (“If a party . . . be illegally imprisoned [by federal authorities] it is
for the courts . . . of the United States and those courts . . . alone to grant him
release.”).
196 For two quite different views of Tarble, see Daniel A. Farber, The Trouble With
Tarble’s: An Excerpt from an Alternative Casebook, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 517, 519–21
(1999) (presenting an edited version of “Ex parte Printz”), and Edward A. Hartnett,
The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 258–60 (2005).
197 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
198 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 191 (1980).
199 The implications of this history are sketched out in more detail in Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 275, 291–92
(2008).
200 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
201 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 28, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
202 In particular, the statute required the courts of appeals to give permission to
appeal adverse district court decisions in certain “gatekeeper” cases, and barred
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court from denials of such permission by the
circuit courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2006); see also Felker, 518 U.S. at 657
(describing the statute).
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jurisdiction,203 and because it did not substantially constrain the scope
of the writ as compared to what was available beforehand.204
Five years later, in INS v. St. Cyr,205 the Court engaged in a far
more thorough discussion of the Suspension Clause in construing
whether one of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of AEDPA and
three related provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,206 including one titled
“Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus,” violated the Suspension Clause.207
Emphasizing that “[t]he fact that this Court would be required to
answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is
in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred
entirely,”208 the Court concluded that neither statute illustrated with
sufficient clarity that Congress intended to bar access to habeas
corpus.209 In other words, the Court invoked the constitutional avoidance canon to require a clear statement of congressional intent before
it would reach whether Congress even could so circumscribe the scope
of the writ.210 And all of that even though it was unclear whether the
Suspension Clause actually protected the claims pressed by the petitioners,211 let alone whether the preclusion of review was therefore
unconstitutional.212
Yet, whereas the Court expended a good deal of effort on identifying the circumstances in which the writ of habeas corpus had tradi203 See Felker, 518 U.S. at 660–62.
204 See id. at 663–64.
205 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
206 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
207 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298–314.
208 Id. at 301 n.13.
209 See id. at 308–14.
210 In dissent, Justice Scalia derided such analysis as requiring a “superclear statement.” See id. at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 See, e.g., id. at 300–01 (majority opinion) (“[R]egardless of whether the protection of the Suspension Clause encompasses all cases covered by the 1867 Amendment
extending the protection of the writ to state prisoners, or by subsequent legal developments, at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it
existed in 1789.’ ” (citations omitted)).
212 The Suspension Clause does not necessarily require the habeas remedy even in
cases where it applies. Rather, it requires a remedy that is at bottom an “adequate”
and “effective” substitute. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (“[T]he
substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test
the legality of a person’s detention does not constitute a suspension . . . .”).
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tionally been available to noncitizens facing deportation,213 it
included exceedingly little analysis of the role of the Suspension
Clause in our constitutional structure. It was enough, for the St. Cyr
majority, that Congress was even coming close to the amorphous
bounds of the Suspension Clause; the discussion of the purpose of
those constraints was left for another day—and one where Congress
had spoken far more clearly.
III. BOUMEDIENE

AND THE

SEPARATION

OF

POWERS

With St. Cyr’s admonition in mind, the 109th Congress enacted
two statutes that far more expressly sought to divest the federal courts
of habeas corpus jurisdiction—and a third when one of the first two
proved ineffective. In addition to the REAL ID Act of 2005,214 and the
DTA, which the Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld largely mooted (by interpreting it as not applying to pending cases),215 Congress provided in
the MCA one of the clearest statements imaginable:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.216

Although the MCA (like the DTA before it) does authorize an
appeal to the D.C. Circuit both from a military commission conviction217 and an “enemy combatant” determination, serious questions
arose from the outset as to whether such remedies were “adequate” or
“effective” substitutes for habeas corpus.218
213 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301–03 & nn.14–23.
214 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 49 U.S.C.).
215 See 548 U.S. 557, 572–84 (2006). For a discussion of the Court’s jurisdictional
analysis, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 557–58 (2007).
216 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006).
217 The Act fails to provide commission defendants with interlocutory relief, see
Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and the D.C. District
Court has held that it constitutionally precludes pretrial habeas relief, as well, see
Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2008).
218 Compare, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381–82 (1977) (finding an alternative remedy adequate as it had the “same scope” as the pre-existing habeas remedy), with Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering the
scope of the remedy provided by the MCA and the DTA), and Bismullah v. Gates, 503
F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same).
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A. Boumediene
With the constitutional question thus finally and squarely
presented, the D.C. Circuit held in Boumediene v. Bush that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause simply did not “apply” to noncitizens held
outside the territorial United States, and so section 7(a) was necessarily constitutional because it offended no constitutional right of the
Guantanamo detainees.219 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari initially,220 it took the rather unusual step of granting certiorari
on rehearing,221 before hearing arguments in December 2007.
On the merits, and as noted above, Justice Kennedy held for the
Court both that the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo Bay,222 and that section 7(a) violates the Clause because the
alternative to habeas corpus provided by the statute—an appeal of the
CSRT to the D.C. Circuit—was an inadequate substitute for habeas.223
As Justice Kennedy explained:
Although we make no judgment as to whether the CSRTs, as
currently constituted, satisfy due process standards, we agree with
petitioners that, even when all the parties involved in this process
act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of
error in the tribunal’s findings of fact. This is a risk inherent in any
process that, in the words of the former Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals, is “closed and accusatorial.” And given that the consequence of error may be detention of persons for the duration of
hostilities that may last a generation or more, this is a risk too significant to ignore.224

Thus, “when the judicial power to issue habeas corpus properly is
invoked the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a
determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate
and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an
219 See 476 F.3d 981, 988–94 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
220 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007) (mem.). Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. See id. at 1479–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
221 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mem.).
222 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). For more on Justice
Scalia’s central critique of this first holding—that it is unfaithful to the Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)—see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem
of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (explaining why
Justice Kennedy was writing on a blank slate with respect to whether the Suspension
Clause “applied” to Guantanamo).
223 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271–74.
224 Id. at 2270 (quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Ginsburg, C.J., concurring with the denial of rehearing en banc)).
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order directing the prisoner’s release.”225 With that analytical frame
in hand, Justice Kennedy concluded that the DTA and MCA did not
confer such authority upon the CSRTs themselves or the D.C. Circuit
on appellate review.226 As such, he found the CSRT process to be an
inadequate substitute for habeas corpus, and therefore in violation of
the Suspension Clause.
It is possible—if not likely—that Kennedy’s analysis of the Suspension Clause controls the due process question as well,227 but the
importance of judicial review to protect the separation of powers was a
stand-alone justification for treating the Suspension Clause differently. Otherwise, as Kennedy noted, the government’s conception of
Guantanamo’s legal status would “lead[ ] to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”228
Writing for the four dissenters, Chief Justice Roberts sharply criticized Justice Kennedy’s refusal to actually decide whether the CSRTs
violated the detainees’ due process rights: “It is grossly premature to
pronounce on the detainees’ right to habeas without first assessing
whether the remedies the DTA system provides vindicate whatever
rights petitioners may claim.”229 Thus:
If the CSRT procedures meet the minimal due process requirements outlined in Hamdi [v. Rumsfeld230], and if an Article III court
is available to ensure that these procedures are followed in future
cases, there is no need to reach the Suspension Clause question.
Detainees will have received all the process the Constitution could
possibly require, whether that process is called “habeas” or something else. The question of the writ’s reach need not be
addressed.231

On its face, the Chief Justice’s criticisms seem powerful. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not purport at any point to directly
respond to either the Chief Justice’s or Justice Scalia’s dissent. But the
225 Id. at 2271.
226 See id. at 2271–74.
227 At least one court has concluded to the contrary. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555
F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reasoning that, notwithstanding Boumediene, the
Guantanamo detainees lack due process rights).
228 Id. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
229 Id. at 2280–81 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
230 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
231 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also id. at 2286–87 (“Declaring that petitioners have a right to habeas in no way
excuses the Court from explaining why the DTA does not protect whatever due process or statutory rights petitioners may have. Because if the DTA provides a means for
vindicating petitioners’ rights, it is necessarily an adequate substitute for habeas
corpus.”).
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critical point of the majority’s analysis comes where Justice Kennedy
explains why detention by executive order is different from detention
pursuant to a criminal conviction—and why habeas corpus in the former category requires more. “[T]he necessary scope of habeas review
in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings,” Kennedy
wrote.232 As a result, in post-conviction habeas cases, “where relief is
sought from a sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of
record, . . . considerable deference is owed to the court that ordered
confinement.”233 Moreover, courts could properly require the
exhaustion of available remedies,234 “because it can be assumed that,
in the usual course, a court of record provides defendants with a fair,
adversary proceeding.”235
Challenges to executive detention, though, were necessarily different, because “[t]he intended duration of the detention and the
reasons for it bear upon the precise scope of the inquiry.”236 Thus,
“[t]he habeas court must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s
power to detain.”237 In other words, reviewing the fairness of the
underlying proceeding would not necessarily be enough, for it might
not allow meaningful review of “both the cause for detention and the
Executive’s power to detain.” Whereas the former part of that inquiry
may rightly focus on the rights of the litigant, the latter focuses on the
power of the courts to serve as a check on the Executive Branch,238
and thereby vindicates the separation of powers concerns Kennedy so
thoroughly documented.
B. Access to the Courts After Boumediene:
On Standing and Colorable Claims
Of course, it is one thing to illustrate the role that the separation
of powers played in Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Boumediene; it is
another thing entirely to ascertain whether such a discussion will have
232 Id. at 2268 (majority opinion).
233 Id. (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.)).
234 Id. (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1886)).
235 Id.
236 Id. at 2269.
237 Id.
238 Indeed, as Professor Jared Goldstein has argued, the entire purpose of habeas
corpus is not to ask whether the petitioner has individual rights that have been violated, but only whether the executive has the authority to detain—that “rights” should
be irrelevant to the habeas inquiry. See Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1180–97.
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broader implications outside the context of habeas corpus. But that is
where the case law surveyed in Parts I and II factors in because it
becomes clear, once the doctrine is properly reconstructed, that separation of powers concerns have long been at the heart of all denial-ofaccess cases, and not just those where the access in question is protected by the writ of habeas corpus. That is, I do not think it is a
coincidence that one can find in Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene
similar arguments as those contained in Justice Brandeis’ concurrence
in St. Joseph Stock Yards,239 or, more indirectly, Justice Murphy’s opinion for the Court in Ex parte Hull.240
The different role that the separation of powers plays may be
more evident in the context of habeas cases, where the writ is specifically designed to serve as a check on executive detention. But in
administrative cases such as St. Joseph Stock Yards, judicial review serves
as a similar check on the executive branch, whose interpretation of
legal questions might otherwise be unreviewable. And in physical
access cases such as Hull (which, though a habeas case, seems less in
line with Boumediene because it is a post-conviction challenge), judicial
review ensures that it is the courts, and not prison wardens or other
executive branch officials, who decide the merits of the underlying
claim.
That separation of powers concerns have some role to play does
not, however, automatically mean that there will be a cognizable freestanding separation of powers injury in denial-of-access cases. Article
III standing limitations will still play a role, requiring the plaintiff to
show an injury in fact to himself; demonstrating a negative impact upon
the courts will not suffice if such an impact does not adversely affect
the plaintiff.
But in that sense, Boumediene may provide an answer to a question
that the earlier case law left unresolved: to show an injury, does the
plaintiff have to show that he would have prevailed on the merits? The
Court in Boumediene clearly thought the answer to that question was
“no.” Rather, the relevant issue is whether the plaintiff might possibly
be injured by the denial of access to the courts. Thus, when cases
such as Webster suggest that the avoidance canon should be invoked
whenever a statute might otherwise deprive a plaintiff of a judicial
forum for a “colorable” constitutional claim,241 perhaps it is the separa239 See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
240 See 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
241 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1988); see also supra note 175 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of the “colorable” requirement).
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tion of powers—rather than the rights of the plaintiff—that explain
why courts needn’t resolve the merits first before deciding whether
the denial of access would thereby raise constitutional problems.
Boumediene itself is instructive on this point. Had the Court
treated the constitutional question as inextricably linked to the eventual merits of individual petitioners’ claims, it could only have
answered the Suspension Clause question on a case-by-case basis, having conducted the very kind of judicial review that Congress had
attempted to foreclose—and having resolved in each case incredibly
difficult and circumstance-specific applications of the law to the facts.
Thus, such review would both frustrate Congress’ purpose, and would
require highly individualized considerations of the facts.
In contrast, if the relevant question is only whether the underlying claim is colorable, courts are necessarily in a far better position to
resolve denial-of-access concerns earlier in the litigation. Moreover,
such a reading is consistent with standing doctrine, which, of course,
asks not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but instead whether the facts
as alleged support relief on the merits.242
In sum, perhaps the central implication of reconstructing the
role that the separation of powers doctrine plays in denial-of-access
cases after Boumediene is that the notion that the denial of access raises
constitutional concerns whenever it interferes with judicial resolution
of viable claims, whether or not the claim ultimately proves meritorious, rests on sounder footing. Thus, state and federal legislative and
executive branches may well have somewhat less leeway to interfere
with the courts than has previously been accepted, and the courts’
“jurisdiction to determine their jurisdiction” may be inadequate in
close cases where resolving the merits of the preclusion of review
requires resolution of complicated and necessarily case-specific questions of fact.
C. Access to the Courts After Boumediene:
A Right to Federal Judicial Review?
On its own, such an understanding would provide at best a modest contribution to the doctrine, for it would suggest that separation
of powers concerns really are linked to—even if somewhat distinct
from—concerns sounding more commonly in the individual rights of
the litigants. But there is another possibility raised by Boumediene. As
noted above, one of the ways in which federal habeas petitions are
unique is the fact that judicial review in that context means federal
242 See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535
(2008).
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judicial review. In the run-of-the-mill denial-of-access case, though,
the plaintiff’s right to judicial review is a right of access to “some judicial forum,” and the prevailing understanding is that state courts of
competent jurisdiction (and perhaps even non-Article III federal
courts) will usually be such a tribunal.
In the typical nonhabeas case, then, it is difficult to identify an
injury to the federal courts separate from an injury to courts in general,
and so it would be difficult to determine whether a right to judicial
review is ever a right to Article III federal judicial review. Certainly, the
Due Process Clause would not require as much, so long as the state
court—or administrative agency—was competent to decide the questions before it. But could there ever be a situation where the separation of powers would require the availability of an Article III judicial
forum to resolve questions of federal law, at least somewhere along
the line?
For the most part, this question does not often arise. As it stands
today, the Supreme Court has broad appellate jurisdiction over federal questions decided in the state courts,243 and the Article III courts
of appeals have broad appellate jurisdiction over federal questions
decided in most non-Article III federal courts, especially administrative agencies.244 Under the Court’s Chevron245 jurisprudence, such
agencies may receive deference in their interpretations of federal law,246
but the critical point is that a litigant is usually entitled to challenge
the agency’s interpretation of federal law before a neutral Article III
decisionmaker.247
Nonetheless, the possibility that there is a separate separation of
powers–based right to Article III review of questions of federal law—to
vindicate the role of the Article III courts in general and the Supreme
Court in particular as the authoritative expositors of federal law—
could well influence attempts by Congress to alter this historical balance. Put another way, perhaps the real implication of restoring the
role of separation of powers concerns to denial-of-access jurispru243 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006); see also, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 41 n.15 (1989) (asserting jurisdiction under § 1257 over state
court judgments where there is a dispute as to whether a state statute violates the U.S.
Constitution).
244 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2349 (2006).
245 See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
246 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006).
247 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (“The judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent. . . . If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
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dence is that we will better appreciate the constitutional problems that
would arise should Congress ever attempt to give state courts or
administrative agencies final say on questions of federal law. Such
tribunals may more than adequately vindicate the underlying rights of
the plaintiffs, and may provide more than the process that is constitutionally due, but what the above analysis suggests is that this would
only be half of the battle.
In this light, consider the Supreme Court’s fascinating (if
neglected) 1977 decision in Territory of Guam v. Olsen.248 Under the
1950 Organic Act of Guam,249 Congress created the Article IV District
Court of Guam and provided it with appellate jurisdiction from
Guam’s local courts “as the [Guam] legislature may determine.”250 In
1974, the Guam legislature created a new Supreme Court of Guam,
and purported to transfer most of the district court’s appellate jurisdiction to the new local supreme court.251 At least at the time,
though, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court possessed statutory appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of
Guam, which meant that the practical effect of the Guam legislature’s
transfer of jurisdiction would be to remove certain classes of federal
questions from the original or appellate jurisdiction of the Article III
courts.252
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan concluded that such a
possibility warranted interpreting the Organic Act as not authorizing
the Guam legislature to so transfer jurisdiction. In his words, “we
should be reluctant without a clear signal from Congress to conclude
that it intended to allow the Guam Legislature to foreclose appellate
review by Art. III courts, including this Court, of decisions of territorial courts in cases that may turn on questions of federal law.”253 This
reluctance, Brennan added, stemmed from the fact that “a construction that denied Guam litigants access to Art. III courts for appellate
review of local-court decisions might present constitutional ques248 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
249 Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1421–1428e (2006)).
250 Id. § 22(a), 64 Stat. at 389–90 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(a)).
The District Court of Guam’s decisions in federal question (and certain other civil)
cases were, in turn, appealable either to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit or directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. § 23, 64 Stat. at 390 (codified as
amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c)).
251 See Santos, 431 U.S. at 197 (discussing the background).
252 After Santos, Congress amended the Organic Act to provide that “the [Guam]
legislature may not preclude the review of any judgment or order” that raises a federal
question.” 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(a).
253 Santos, 431 U.S. at 201.
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tions.”254 Even though a litigant’s due process rights would unquestionably be vindicated by the judicial review he received in the Guam
local courts, Brennan nonetheless suggested that the Constitution
might bar the Guam legislature’s effective preclusion of Article III
appellate review in certain federal question cases. 255
Whatever the significance of Brennan’s opinion in Santos,
Boumediene provides a fascinating opportunity to see through the various doctrinal safety nets that the Supreme Court has erected to prevent such fundamental questions from arising. In nonhabeas cases, a
litigant may never have an individualized right to Article III judicial
review, but the separation of powers might nevertheless guarantee
him such an opportunity, as an appellate matter if not originally. Of
course, such a right could not create appellate jurisdiction where
none exists. But in the case of state courts, as another example, we
might see this analysis as helping to explain the relationship between
the “presumption of concurrent jurisdiction”—the idea that most federal questions are properly cognizable in state courts256—and the existence of section 25 of the Judiciary Act (today’s 28 U.S.C. § 1257),257
which provides the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction from the
state courts. Without the latter, it may well be true that the separation
of powers—and not any individual right of an individual litigant—
would bar the former.258 More generally, it might be impossible to
understand the current structure of our judicial system, and the limits
254 Id. at 204 (citing Hart, supra note 155).
255 As an amusing historical footnote, Brennan’s opinion in Santos repeatedly
cited to (and quoted from) a similarly-themed dissenting opinion filed in an earlier
Ninth Circuit case that raised the same issue—by then-Circuit Judge Anthony M. Kennedy. See Agana Bay Dev. Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, 529 F.2d
952, 958–61 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). On closer inspection, Kennedy’s opinion in Agana Bay raised the same constitutional concerns that Brennan
articulated in Santos. See, e.g., id. at 959 (“[F]or Guam to abolish all appellate jurisdiction would be a wholly irresponsible legislative act, raising serious constitutional questions. It is unlikely that Congress intended to give the Guam legislature the power to
commit such an act, and such intent should not be assumed in the absence of express
language to that effect.”).
256 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990).
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
351 (1816) (declaring section 25 of the Judiciary Act constitutional).
258 In that sense, the analysis herein is both consistent with (and derives support
from) the intriguing argument advanced by Professor Pfander that the power of state
courts to decide federal questions should be understood not as inherent in their jurisdiction, but as deriving from Congress’ decision not to make federal jurisdiction over
such a claim exclusive in the first place. See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State
Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 191, 238 (2007).
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on how it might be altered, without appreciating the separation of
powers concerns that arise when tribunals other than the Article III
courts are in a position to have the final say—and when access to the
Article III courts is denied.
CONCLUSION
I suspect that scholars and jurists alike will find every temptation
to pigeonhole Boumediene as a Guantanamo-specific (or, at least, War
on Terrorism specific) decision: that Justice Kennedy’s analysis can
only be understood as being motivated by a decidedly unpopular
prison run by a decidedly unpopular President, and not as being motivated by deeper principles about judicial review and the general role
of the federal courts in our federal system. Such views of the decision
may ultimately be proven right, although I, for one, have my doubts.
But regardless of Boumediene’s long-term force as direct precedent, it would be unfortunate if we passed up the opportunity to take
the framework of Justice Kennedy’s constitutional analysis of the judicial review question seriously, and ask what it might actually mean to
re-characterize the denial of access to the courts in separation of powers terms. In the analysis herein, I have suggested two possible implications: one that is exceedingly modest; the other that is probably
overbroad. But if one thing is clear, Justice Kennedy was not
inventing this idea from whole cloth, and there is a far richer and
more thought-provoking body of case law to inform what Boumediene
means going forward than we might previously have thought.

